

## DECLASSIFIED

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## MEMORANDUM

1. The Vice President's conversations with NATO leaders in Paris brought forth three major problems which must be considered:
  - a) Despite the optimism of high officials, our European allies are still slow and reluctant in building up their strength.
  - b) General Clay's presence in Berlin has ~~caused some administrative and possibly personality difficulties~~ <sup>led to</sup> ~~which should be resolved~~.
  - c) There is a need for clearcut policy guidance to the NATO military commander as to how he should handle the situation at Steinfurcken.
2. The fact that the European allies are reluctant to engage in the necessary military buildup is apparent from analyzing the discussions of Ambassadors Gavin and Finletter. Both claim the situation is improving and that they are optimistic. But both concede that the "improvement" is in terms of promises, rather than performance. Furthermore, after stating their optimism both discuss at length the reasons for European reluctance to rearm. These reasons may be completely valid. But they sound suspiciously like the classic alibi of the public relations official whose client is caught in an embarrassing situation: "The situation is entirely normal and we are doing everything we can to correct it."
3. The complications involving General Clay are due entirely to the peculiar administrative setup in Berlin. As it now stands, Ambassador Dowling has authority; the military commandant of Berlin has authority and General Norstad has authority. This leaves unclear the extent, if any, to which General Clay has authority. He has no control over the troops and no control over the civilian population. Apparently, he is primarily a symbol and General Clay is an active, "get-it-done" type of personality who does not react well to being a symbol. <sup>clearly defined</sup> ~~Definition~~ <sup>his</sup> ~~status should take the point~~ <sup>into</sup> ~~consideration.~~

4. The Steinfuecken-East Berlin situation is a parallel-- in miniature-- of the West Berlin-East Germany situation. It represents an opportunity for refugees to escape from East Berlin but then presents the problem of how to get them to West Berlin across 2,000 meters of communist-held territory. Furthermore, the refugees must be evacuated by helicopter--a far more tempting target to the communists than faster moving forms of air transport. Obviously, if we continue to evacuate refugees we must test communist intentions at the risk ~~of~~ We are already running that risk in Berlin itself but at this point we have thought it through and calculated the risks. We apparently have not done so in regard to Steinbruecken as the NATO commander does not regard himself as having clear policy directives and is "playing the situation by feel."

5. Recommendations:

- a) That some of the highest and most persuasive officials of the administration be sent to countries such as Norway and Denmark for personal "heart-to-heart" talks with the chiefs of government as to their contribution to NATO.
- b) That thought be given to clarifying General Clay's position.
- c) That a policy decision be made as to whether and under what circumstances the United States will continue or cease to evacuate refugees from Steinfuecken. Obviously, this situation could be "solved" only by "solving" the Berlin situation itself. But the NATO commander should have guidance at least as thorough as that he has on West Berlin and the access routes.

In principle, we must determine in advance what we wish to achieve and what will be the results of our various actions. Our present moves will then have the strength of deliberation rather than the weaknesses of afterthought.